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Abstract 
This paper studies asymmetry of information and transfers within 712 extended family networks 
from Tanzania. Using cross-reports on asset holdings, we construct measures of mis-perception 
of living standards among households within the same network. We contrast altruism, pressure, 
exchange and risk sharing as motives to transfer in simple models with asymmetric information. 
Testing the model predictions in the data uncovers the active role played by recipients of 
transfers. Our findings suggest that recipients set the terms of the transfers, either by exerting 
pressure on donors or because they hold substantial bargaining power in their exchange 
relationships. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Private transfers among extended family members are pervasive in developing countries. 
A strand of the literature has investigated the determinants of these transfers (see, for example, 
Rapoport and Docquier 2006 and Cox and Fafchamps 2008). That literature has, however, 
typically assumed perfect information about one’s income between family members. In contrast, 
a growing literature on migration suggests that there could be substantial asymmetry of 
information even among close relatives (McKenzie, Gibson, and Stillman 2013, Seshan and 
Zubrickas 2015 and Seror 2012). 
Asymmetry of information may matter for private transfers. Using lab experiments in the 
field to vary the observability of gains, Jakiela and Ozier (2016), in the context of kin and 
neighbors in rural Kenyan villages, and Ambler (2015), in the context of migrants from El 
Salvador and their family members at home, show that subjects transfer more when their gains 
are made public. Seshan and Zubrickas (2017) finds that the more wives of Indian migrants 
working in Qatar underestimate the overseas income of their husbands, the lower the share of 
income sent home as annual remittances. Nyarko, Joseph, and Wang (2015) find remittances 
from workers in the UAE are strongly correlated with more easily observable variation in 
earnings. Batista and Narciso (2013) observe higher remittances from a sample of migrants in 
Ireland when they are offered free phone cards, arguing that it is due to improved information. 
This paper uses a unique dataset of 712 extended family networks originating from the 
Kagera region in Tanzania to study the relationship between the asymmetry of information and 
private transfers within these networks. Making use of cross-reports on asset ownership among 
households belonging to the same extended family networks, we measure each household’s 
misperceptions about the living standards of the other households in its network. We then explore 
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and contrast altruism, pressure, exchange and risk sharing as motives to transfer. Under these 
competing explanations, models of inter-household transfers with asymmetry of information 
yield predictions about the correlations between misperceptions and transfers after controlling for 
the income of the two parties, as well as the correlations between incomes and transfers after 
controlling for misperceptions. We refer to these as ‘partial’ correlations. Taking these 
predictions to the data, we find that transfers co-move with both the donor’s actual and perceived 
living standards, but not with the recipient’s actual or perceived living standards. This is 
consistent with a relationship where the recipients have power and request transfers from the 
donor, either using pressure to give or in exchange of services. 
Our paper makes a number of contributions. First, our paper provides a coherent and 
generally applicable approach to measuring asymmetric information through surveys. In many 
environments of interest, household income is generated from smallholder farming or informal 
non-agricultural businesses and a large share of consumption is home-produced. In such 
contexts, measuring self-reported household income is problematic (Deaton 1997), so we should 
not expect to be able to measure perceptions of income by others. In contrast, questions on asset 
holdings are common in household surveys and provide an attractive indicator of medium term 
standards of living. Furthermore, eliciting beliefs from respondents about asset holdings of others 
can be done at low cost in linked surveys. 
The question arises, though, of how to translate households’ beliefs about the various 
assets holding of others into measures of households’ beliefs regarding the living standards of 
others. We propose a measure of misperception that consists of a weighted sum of differences 
between believed and actual asset holdings. The weights are set depending on how these 
particular assets predict per capita consumption in the population. This, thus, captures the 
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percentage by which a household overestimates, or underestimates when negative, the per capita 
consumption of another household. 
Our second contribution is descriptive. Applying this method to the data allows us to give 
a complete characterization of the asymmetry of information among the 712 Tanzanian extended 
family networks. Not surprisingly, we find a substantial level of asymmetry of information and 
show that it correlates positively with genetic, social and physical distance between households. 
However, there is no systematic underestimation or overestimation: perceptions are, on average, 
correct. 
Our third contribution is to relate transfers to misperceptions by developing simple 
theoretical models of transfers with asymmetry of information regarding recipient and donor 
income. We develop static models that contrast three possible motives for transfers: altruism, in 
which the potential donor cares about the recipient; pressure, in which the recipient has some 
means of imposing a utility cost on the donor; and exchange, in which the transfer represents a 
payment for some good or service provided by the recipient.
i
 Our model of altruism predicts a 
negative partial correlation of transfers with both the recipient’s actual income and the donor’s 
misperception of that income. A model of exchange in which the donor has all the bargaining 
power and risk-sharing motives also predict a negative partial correlation between the transfer 
and the recipient’s income. In contrast, if the driving motivation is pressure or exchange in which 
the recipient has all the bargaining power, it is the donor’s income and the recipient’s 
misperception of the donor’s income that matter and are positively correlated with the transfers. 
Note that these predictions capture not only the effect of information on transfers, but also the 
feedback mechanisms whereby transfers themselves, or the amount requested, are informative. 
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The data suggest that recipients of transfers play an active role in their relationship with donors. 
Rather than being passive, recipients seem to set the terms of transfers, either by exerting 
pressure to give on donors or by holding the bargaining power during an exchange of services. 
With respect to policy, this implies that we should probably worry less about possible crowding 
out effects of public transfers, and more about inefficiencies due to the cost of pressure and the 
moral hazard that can result from it (Alger and Weibull 2008). 
This is consistent with the recent experimental evidence of Jakiela and Ozier (2016), 
Ambler (2015), Boltz, Marazyan, and Villar (2015) and Squires (2016), and the large 
ethnographic literature highlighting the importance of disapproval, shaming, ostracism and other 
means of pressure, as described and cited in Platteau (2014) and Chort, Gubert, and Senne 2012). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the data on extended 
family networks in Tanzania that we use to build the measures of asymmetric information. These 
measures are defined and validated in Section III. Section IV presents competing models of 
transfers. Section V studies the correlations between transfers and misperceptions of income to 
examine the empirical validity of the models and Section VI concludes. 
 
II. DATA 
This paper uses the 2010 wave of the Kagera Health and Development Survey (KHDS).
ii
 
Kagera, in the north-western part of Tanzania, has a population of 2.5 million people, the vast 
majority of whom engage in agriculture. The Kagera region is relatively isolated: it borders 
landlocked countries Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi and is 1,400 km away from the main port 
and commercial capital, Dar es Salaam. Using these data, De Weerdt (2010) and Beegle, De 
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Weerdt, and Dercon (2011) have shown that the diversification of income generating activities 
and migration are key household strategies for growth. 
KHDS 2010 attempted to trace all individuals belonging to households that were 
surveyed in the original survey KHDS 1991-94. The latter interviewed 915 households in 52 
villages’ representative of the Kagera Region over four rounds from 1991 to 1994. KHDS 2010 
searched for any individual listed in any household roster in KHDS 1991-94 and interviewed 
households in which these individuals were found residing in 2010. The survey attained very 
high recontact rates. Out of the original 915 households there are only 71 households (8%) where 
not a single individual was traced (excluding 26 households where all members had died). The 
interviewing team accounted, in 2010, for 88% of the 6,353 individuals listed on any KHDS 
1991-94 roster: 68% of the original respondents were visited and surveyed, while 20% of 
respondents were confirmed to have died. 12% of individuals were not found. Out of the 
interviewed individuals 45% lived in the baseline village, 53% had migrated within the country, 
2% to another East African country (primarily Uganda) and 0.3% had left East Africa. 
Practically, we take advantage of this unique data structure to define a split-off  household 
as any household that contains at least one member from the original roster (from KHDS 1991-
94) and an extended family network as a network of split-off households, all originating from the 
same baseline household.
iii
 
Note that the location of a household surveyed in 2010 depends strongly on the original 
member’s role in the original household. We find that 58% of households who host the 
household head 18 years after baseline still live in the baseline village, as compared to only 22% 
of the other households in the family networks. The latter moved more frequently to nearby 
villages (17% of them versus 6% of households with former head) or to elsewhere in Kagera 
(41% of them versus 19% of households with former head). Moreover, split-off households with 
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daughters of the former head are less likely (21%) to live in baseline village than split-off 
households with sons (30%), a reflection of patrilocal marriage customs. 
In addition to a detailed questionnaire regarding their own consumption
iv
 and asset 
holdings, we designed survey questions regarding the asset holdings and relative standing of the 
other households in their network, as well as questions about the interactions and transfers 
between their household and each of the other households in their network. For example, if the 
original members have split into three different households, the network consists of these three 
households and each household is asked questions about the other two, giving us a data set of 6 
dyadic observations. Having data on both sides of each pair of linked households in the networks 
allows us to contrast the beliefs held by one household about the other with the reality as 
recorded in the questionnaire. 
After dropping households that did not split or have missing or incomplete interviews, 
our ‘large’ sample consists of 3,173 households from 712 extended family networks, yielding 
13,808 unique within-family pairwise combinations of households. Some of the asymmetric 
information questions were skipped for split-off households residing in the same location as the 
respondent. Wherever the analysis below makes use of these skipped questions, we revert to our 
‘small’ sample: a subsample of 9,032 dyads, all living in different locations, and encompassing 
2,807 households within 613 extended family networks. Tables 11 and 12 in Appendix provide 
summary statistics on these samples. 
The survey collected data on amounts remitted, both in-kind and cash. Over two thirds of 
households in our sample report remitting in the year preceding the survey. The average amount 
of cash remitted, among those who did, was USD 35, representing, on average, 7% of 
consumption per capita and 2% of total household consumption for the remitting households. 
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That average masks a wide distribution, with the top decile remitting USD 160, or 8% of their 
total household consumption. Out of these transfers, 59% goes to recipients within the extended 
family network. 
In empirical applications networks are typically self-defined, with questionnaires probing 
each respondent for a list of network partners in the sense of friendship or households to whom 
one can ask help or borrow money from. Our network definition is different as it is based on 
membership in a household 18 years ago. Our definition has the advantage of being objectively 
defined, not subject to recall and the definition of a link is not based on the existence of transfers. 
Attrition aside, we would have complete networks defined in this way alleviating econometric 
concerns related to sampled networks (Chandrasekhar and Lewis 2011). However, despite the 
tracking success of KHDS 2010 we have some attrition that is likely to be non random. The 
principal strategy for tracing people from the original KHDS household rosters was to obtain 
their contact details through interviewed relatives. Not surprisingly, attrition rates are higher 
among households that have infrequent contact with their family members. Thus, we are likely 
looking at a somewhat more connected set of family members.
v
 
 
III. QUANTIFYING ASYMMETRY OF INFORMATION 
A. Beliefs about Assets, Education and Employment 
We can measure the extent to which extended family members are (mis)informed about 
each other by cross-checking the beliefs of any household i about educational attainment, 
employment and asset ownership of household j with the information in household j’s 
questionnaire. We can do this over 8 different items listed in Table 1.vi Household i can 
underestimate, correctly estimate or overestimate the status of household j; household i could 
De Weerdt, Genicot and Mesnard     9 
 
also answer that it does not know the educational attainment, employment status or assets owned 
by house-hold j. Table 1 gives frequencies of these cross-reports: most underestimates of assets 
occur with respect to land and phones, while most overestimates occur with respect to vehicles. 
Educational attainment and employment have the most correct perceptions. Note, 
however, that very few people overestimate the employment position of their relatives, while 
relatively more underestimate (that is think their family members do not have a formal job, while 
in fact they do). 
Ultimately, we are interested in measuring what i’s perception on these 8 items tells us 
about i’s perception of j’s standard of living, and to what extent and in which direction i 
misperceives j’s true standard of living.  A naive measure of asymmetry of information would be 
the simple sum of perceptions on the 8 items above adding up overestimates (set to +1), 
underestimates (set to −1), correct responses (set to 0) and don’t know responses (set to 0).  
However, this approach has a number of problems.  First, it assumes that all items carry the same 
weight in the measure. Second, it assumes that the weight of each item is separable from the 
household’s characteristics, and from other items. Third, it assumes that all items signal 
something positive about the individual’s living standards. An example of a violation of these 
last two assumptions would be if livestock ownership signals high income for rural households, 
but low income for urban households. In the next section we alleviate these concerns with a 
novel measure of asymmetric information: a weighted sum of misperceptions and their 
interactions, with weights set according to the correlations of the perceived items with household 
per capita consumption in the population. 
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B. Perceived Consumption and Misperceptions 
 Let Aj denote the profile of actual ownership of assets, education and occupation for 
household j, including any relevant interaction effects among assets, education and occupation. 
This is the profile over which i expresses beliefs Bij. In addition, let Xj be a vector of basic 
characteristics of household j that we would think are public knowledge among relatives. 
Given i’s belief about the profile of ownership of j, what can we infer about i’s estimate 
of j’s consumption? The view that we take here is that by observing households around him, i has 
learned the joint distribution of ownership profiles Aj and household per capita consumption cj 
conditional on household characteristics Xj and Aj. 
Hence, we first estimate a consumption regression among our households 
(1) ln⁡(𝑐𝑗) = α𝐀𝑗 + ⁡β𝐗𝑗 + ⁡γ𝐀𝑗𝐗𝑗 +⁡ϵ𝑗 
where cj is the actual per capita consumption for household j. See Section III.C. for more 
information on how we estimate Equation (1). 
 
Retrieving the coefficients estimated (α, β, γ) from (1), we can then use the characteristics Xj 
and i’s beliefs about j’s assets Bij to construct measures of i’s perception of j’s consumption. Let 
(2) ln⁡(𝐶𝑖𝑗) = α𝐁𝑖𝑗 + ⁡β𝐗𝑗 + ⁡γ𝐁𝑖𝑗𝐗𝑗. 
 
How does ln(Cij) relate to i’s beliefs regarding j’s log per capita consumption? The answer 
depends on what knowledge i has of the unobservables ϵj in Equation (1). We consider two 
extreme assumptions regarding i’s knowledge of ϵj and use it to construct two alternative 
measures of i’s perception of j’s consumption. One benchmark is to think that households are 
much better informed than we are about all unobservable characteristics, including temporary 
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shocks, that affect the income of their relatives. Hence, at the one end of the spectrum, we can 
assume that j’s relatives are perfectly informed of ϵj, in which case i’s perceived consumption for 
j is  
𝑃𝑖𝑗 = ln(𝐶𝑖𝑗) +⁡𝜖𝑗. 
 
In this case, if household i held perfect knowledge on household j’s assets then the 
predicted consumption would equal the actual consumption. 
An alternative benchmark is to posit that household i uses only Xj and her beliefs about 
j’s assets Bij in forming her estimate of household j’s per capita consumption Cij. This assumes 
that household i has no additional information about household j, over and above Xj, so that i’s 
perceived consumption for j is  
𝑃′𝑖𝑗 = ln(𝐶𝑖𝑗). 
 
We believe that the truth lies somewhere in between these two estimates. 
This method implicitly assumes that any information that i has received about j is 
captured in ϵj or in Bij, and therefore does not have an independent effect on i’s perception of j’s 
consumption. For example, the transfers that j has given to i or the frequency with which j calls i 
can provide information to i regarding j’s standard of living. We assume that this information is 
fully reflected in i’s beliefs about j’s assets and therefore in i’s perception of j’s consumption. 
This approach accounts for the possibility that one could make a number of mistakes regarding a 
relative’s assets and still have a fairly accurate estimate of his household per capita consumption. 
It is entirely possible that a person, when answering the survey questions about her relatives, 
reports beliefs on assets that are consistent with her perception of the relative’s consumption. She 
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might report that her relative has a TV but no phone, while her relative has a phone but no TV, 
but if both asset ownership profiles correspond to similar lifestyle (per capita consumption) in the 
overall population it amounts to the same perceived consumption. 
Using these two benchmarks, we can create the following two measures of misperceptions – 
the difference between i’s perceived consumption for j and j’s actual consumption: 
(3) Ω𝑖𝑗 = 𝑃𝑖𝑗 − ln(𝑐𝑗) = (𝐁𝑖𝑗 −⁡𝐀𝑗)α + γ(𝐁𝑖𝑗 −⁡𝐀𝑗)𝐗𝑗,  and 
(4) Ω′𝑖𝑗 = 𝑃′𝑖𝑗 − ln(𝑐𝑗) = (𝐁𝑖𝑗 −⁡𝐀𝑗)α + γ(𝐁𝑖𝑗 −⁡𝐀𝑗)𝐗𝑗 −⁡ϵ𝑗. 
 
Our measure of misperception Ωij is a weighted sum of the difference in believed and actual 
occupation, education and assets. Thus, it is well suited to measure misperceptions of medium-
term living standards, rather than asymmetry of information regarding temporary shocks. In 
contrast, Ω'ij might measure not only misperceptions on medium term living standards, but also 
be affected by beliefs regarding temporary shocks, which are part of ϵj. For example, a temporary 
positive consumption shock to j, ϵj > 0, with constant Aj will lower Ω'ij – making it more likely 
for us to conclude that i underestimates j’s lifestyle – but will not affect our measurement of Ωij. 
 
The log specification conveniently implies that Ωij is a good approximation of the percentage 
by which i overestimates (Ωij > 0) or underestimates (Ωij < 0) j’s consumption. 
 
C. Measuring Weights for Perceived Consumption 
To determine which variables to consider for the weights we proceed as follows. There 
are 12 variables that we can reasonably assume to be known by other family members and 
therefore be part of Xj. These are the gender, age and squared age of the household head, eight 
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indicator variables capturing the household’s age-sex composition and a dummy indicating 
whether the household resides in rural or urban area. For Ai, we consider in their level form the 8 
asset variables for which we have beliefs questions: educational attainment, employment and the 
ownership of the six assets listed in Table 1. Then all 12 common knowledge variables are 
interacted with each other, all 8 asset variables are interacted with each other and all 12∗8 
interactions across both sets are made. This gives us a total of 190 interactions and 20 level 
variables to consider. 
We want to remain agnostic about which of these 210 variables should enter the 
prediction regression and turn to approximately sparse regression models to ensure variables are 
selected with a view to good out-of-sample forecasts. In the Least Absolute Shrinkage and 
Selection Models (LASSO) of Frank and Friedman (1993) and Tibshirani (1996), the parameters 
are chosen in such a way to minimize the sum of least squares plus a term that penalizes 
additional variables. We use the post-LASSO estimator of Belloni et al. (2012), which proceeds 
in two steps. In a first step, the LASSO procedure is used to select all variables with non-zero 
weight. In a second step, the weights in the beliefs regression are determined by taking the 
coefficients from an OLS regression that uses only the variables selected in the first step.vii 
 
Table 2 reports the final weights. Of the 8 candidate asset variables, only one, livestock 
ownership, did not get selected. In other words, livestock (by itself and in the various interacted 
forms it was considered) did not correlate sufficiently with per capita consumption once other 
variables were controlled for. Half of the 12 common knowledge variables were dropped in 
levels and only 5 interaction terms were retained. The final regression explains 57% of the total 
sample variation with 17 variables and a constant. 
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Note that when predicting household i’s beliefs about household j, we need to decide how 
to treat “don’t know" (DK) answers to the assets, educational attainment and employment 
questions. We take the conservative approach of replacing DKs with location-specific sample 
means, depending on whether household j lives in an urban or rural area. We also control for the 
number of DK answers in the regressions in Sections III.D. and E. 
Applying the weights from Table 2 to Equation (3) and (4), we can calculate Ω and Ω', 
for each ij pair. Figure 1 shows kernel density estimations for both measures. The mean (standard 
deviation) is 0.006 (0.315) for Ω and 0.002 (0.532) for Ω'. Figure 1 also shows 95% confidence 
intervals around the sample means. These were obtained through the bootstrap procedure 
described in Appendix 1. They are [-0.013, 0.027] and [-0.020, 0.023] for Ω and Ω' respectively. 
This means that there is no indication of any systematic overestimation or underestimation of 
others’ standards of living. 
 
Figure 1: Distribution of Ω and Ω’ (N=9,032) 
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However, there is significant asymmetry of information. The average of the absolute 
values of Ω and Ω' are 0.21 and 0.42, meaning that people are, on average, 21 and 42 per cent 
mistaken, respectively. The kernel smoother from Figure 1 obfuscates the fact that Ω equals 
exactly zero in 30% of dyads, where all guesses were correct. The Ω' distribution does not exhibit 
this lumping at zero because it subtracts the ϵj term in its calculation. For the same reason the 
distribution of Ω' has a much larger spread than that of Ω. 
 
D. Validation 
We first validate Ω and Ω' by comparing them with a completely different measure of 
asym-metric information. For each of its network partners, any household i was asked to imagine 
a nine-step ladder where the top of the ladder, step 9, represents the best possible life and the 
bottom, step 1, represents the worst possible life. Household i was then asked to rank each 
household j in his network on the ladder. Table 3 shows that, using household i fixed effects, if 
household i places household j higher on the ladder, controlling for household j’s actual 
consumption, then Ωij and Ω'ij are higher. That is, for 2 relatives with the same actual 
consumption, household i’s misperception of their standards of living is highly correlated with 
where he differentially places each on the ladder. The strong correlations between our 
misperception measures and these subjective perceptions give us confidence that Ω and Ω' are 
indeed capturing latent beliefs. When testing the model in Section V we will use the ladder as an 
alternative measure of misperceptions to verify the robustness of the results. 
We further validate our misperception measures by verifying how they co-vary with 
variables that measure the fluidity of information flows between the two nodes. It is very natural 
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to expect individuals who are closer to each other, physically or socially, to have better 
information about each other. Table 4 relates misperceptions to a number of proximity variables 
through probit regressions. In the first column, the dependent variable is whether Ωij is zero, 
which requires that all the beliefs of i regarding j are correct and occurs in 30% of all dyads. In 
the second column, the dummy is whether Ω'ij, which is never exactly zero, is close to 0 in the 
sense that it falls in [−0.5σ, +0.5σ] where σ = 0.532 is the standard deviation of Ω' (39% of all 
dyads). 
In line with our expectations we see that the accuracy of perceptions, and in particular as 
measured by Ωij, increases with proximity variables such as kilometers of geographic distance 
between the households, whether a parent-child link exists across the two households, whether 
they communicated in the past 2 years and whether they recently shared a meal together. This is 
also consistent with the findings of Alatas et al. (2016) in Indonesian networks. We also see that 
there is less accurate information about extended family members living in urban areas, 
controlling for distance travelled. 
 
IV. MODEL OF MISPERCEPTIONS AND TRANSFERS 
In this Section, we present simple models relating income, misperceptions of income and 
transfers. First, we model the three possible motivations for transfers in a static context: altruism, 
exchange and pressure. Then, we consider a dynamic model of risk sharing with asymmetry of 
information. For each model, we derive predictions regarding the correlations between income, 
misperceptions and transfers. 
A. The Static Model 
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Preferences and Income: Consider two individuals, a recipient R and a donor D. A first possible 
motive for transfers is altruism: the donor cares not only about her own utility of consumption, 
but also about the recipient’s. Denote by ui(c) the utility of consumption of i ∈ {R, D}, with the 
usual properties that u' > 0 and u'' < 0, and denote by αD ∈ [0, 1) D’s altruism, that is the weight 
that the donor puts on the recipient’s utility of consumption (following Becker 1974).viii 
 
The recipient R and donor D’s utilities are then vR = uR(cR) and 
(5) 𝑣𝐷 = 𝑢𝐷(𝑐𝐷) +⁡α𝐷𝔼𝐷𝑢𝑅(?̃?𝑅) 
where ?̃?𝑅 is R’s consumption as perceived by D. Note that we could easily assume that the 
recipient is also altruistic towards the donor. 
 
Income and Information: We assume that R and D’s actual incomes are private information, 
though the following income distributions are common knowledge. The donor D’s income y is 
either low (L) with a probability 1 −qD or high (H) with a probability qD, L < H and qD ∈ (0,1). 
The recipient R’s income x takes a low value (l) with probability 1 − qR or a high value (h) 
otherwise, l < h and qR∈(0,1). 
 
Let i ∈ {R,D} be one party and j ≠ i ∈ {R,D} be the other. Individual i’s beliefs about j’s income 
are based on j’s actual probability of having a high income, but will also reflect any information 
about the actual realization of j’s income that i receives. Assume that i receives a signal sj ∈ (0,1) 
about j’s income m drawn from the conditional distribution fj(s|m). The realization of the signals 
is common knowledge. We assume that the conditional distributions satisfy the monotonic 
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likelihood property, so that high values of the signal are relatively more likely when income is 
higher, but also that at the extreme, these signals are almost perfectly informative: 
[S1]   
𝑓𝑅(𝑠|ℎ)
𝑓𝑅(𝑠|ℓ)
  and  
𝑓𝐷(𝑠|𝐻)
𝑓𝐷(𝑠|𝐿)
  are strictly increasing in s, 
[S2]  lim𝑠↑1
𝑓𝑅(𝑠|ℓ)
𝑓𝑅(𝑠|ℎ)
= lim𝑠↑1
𝑓𝐷(𝑠|𝐿)
𝑓𝐷(𝑠|𝐻)
= 0  and   lim𝑠↓0
𝑓𝑅(𝑠|ℎ)
𝑓𝑅(𝑠|ℓ)
= lim𝑠↓0
𝑓𝐷(𝑠|𝐻)
𝑓𝐷(𝑠|𝐿)
= 0. 
After using the signals and Bayes rule to update their beliefs, the posterior beliefs that the 
recipient and the donor hold about each other are given by 
𝜋𝑠𝑅⁡
𝑅 =
𝑞𝑅𝑓𝑅(𝑠𝑅|ℎ)
𝑞𝑅𝑓𝑅(𝑠𝑅|ℎ)+(1−𝑞𝑅)𝑓𝑅(𝑠𝑅|ℓ)
    and  
 𝜋𝑠𝐷⁡
𝐷 =
𝑞𝐷𝑓𝐷(𝑠𝐷|𝐻)
𝑞𝐷𝑓𝐷(𝑠𝐷|𝐻)+(1−𝑞𝐷)𝑓𝐷(𝑠𝐷|𝐿)
 
where πs
j
 is the probability that the other party assigns to j having a high income after observing 
signal s. 
 
Pressure: There is a large literature describing the pressure under which many households in 
developing countries find themselves to transfer to relatives (see Chort, Gubert, and Senne 2012 
and Platteau 2014 among others). 
To model this pressure motive, we assume that R can commit on imposing a punishment, 
a utility cost p ∈ [0, P], on D. The nature of this punishment is likely to differ from household to 
household. There may be ways in which retaliation or feelings of guilt or shame can be directly 
meted out to someone who does not transfer enough. Similar punishments, but also loss of social 
status could be imposed indirectly through the community (see Cox and Fafchamps 2008). 
Pressure might be available only at certain times, for instance when the recipient has a well-
known need (such as suffering from some observable shock, or because school fees are due). 
 
De Weerdt, Genicot and Mesnard     19 
 
Exchange: Finally, another possible motive for transfers, in particular for migrants, is quid-pro-
quo. As discussed by Cox and Fafchamps (2008) and Rapoport and Docquier (2006), private 
transfers might be given in exchange for goods or services provided by the recipient. This could 
be help with young children, old-age support or maintaining property rights for migrants. 
Assume that, at times, the recipient is in position to provide a service of utility value v to the 
donor at a utility cost c. 
 
B. Altruism 
Consider first a situation in which altruism is driving the transfers: αD > 0, P = 0 and v = 0. 
The recipient R has no credible way to signal her income. Hence, for a given realization of her 
income y and the signal sR = s, D chooses to make a transfer t to R that maximizes 
(6) 𝑢𝐷(𝑦 − 𝑡) +⁡α𝐷[𝜋𝑠
𝑅𝑢𝑅(ℎ + 𝑡) + (1 − 𝜋𝑠
𝑅)𝑢𝑅(ℓ + 𝑡)]. 
 
If interior, D’s choice of transfer t∗ strictly increase on his own income y and decreases in πs
R
, 
his posterior beliefs regarding R’s income. Hence, the altruism model predicts a positive 
correlation between transfers and the donor’s actual income, and a negative correlation between 
transfers and the donor’s perception of the recipient’s income. The latter implies a negative 
correlation between transfers and the donor’s misperception of the recipient income controlling 
for the actual income and a negative correlation between transfers and the recipient’s income 
controlling for the donor’s misperception. Since there is a one-to-one correspondence between 
the donor’s income and the transfer that she chooses when a positive transfer is made, upon 
receiving a transfer, R would know D’s realized income. Hence, no correlation is predicted 
between the transfers and the recipient’s misperception of the donor’s income.ix 
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C. Pressure 
Now, let’s study the case without altruism αD = 0 and without services v = 0, but in which 
transfers are driven by the possibility of pressure: P > 0. Since the cost for D of making a given 
transfer is decreasing in her income, R can make use of pressure not only to receive a transfer but 
also to get D to reveal her real income. 
Indeed, given his income x, R offers a menu to D of transfers t and contingent pressure p(t): 
− a transfer of TH or more implies no pressure; 
− a transfer of TL implies pressure 𝑝; and 
− any other transfer is associated with pressure ?̅?. 
The offer is designed so that the donor chooses to give TH and faces no pressure when her income 
is high, while she chooses to give TL and faces pressure 𝑝 when her income is low. 
 
Incentive constraints: To simplify notation, denote by Vy(T ) D’s utility if her income is y and 
she makes a transfer T : 
(7) 𝑉𝑦(𝑇) = 𝑢𝐷(𝑦 − 𝑇). 
 
The incentive constraints for both type H and type L to comply with the offered menu are 
(8) 𝑉𝐻(𝑇𝐻) ≥ ⁡max𝑡{𝑉𝐻(𝑡) − 𝑝(𝑡)} 
(9) 𝑉𝐿(𝑇𝐿) − 𝑝 ≥⁡max𝑡{𝑉𝐿(𝑡) − 𝑝(𝑡)} 
where p(t) is the pressure triggered by the scheme. D’s preferred transfer to R is 0 while R would 
like to receive as much as possible. Hence, R uses the highest pressure as a threat  𝑝 = 𝑃 and, if 
D has a low income, her preferred deviation would be to make no transfer.  
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It follows that the incentive constraint for type L in (9) becomes, 
(10) 𝑉𝐿(𝑇𝐿) − 𝑝 ≥⁡𝑉𝐿(0) − 𝑃. 
 
Now, for type H, the relevant constraint ensures that H does not want to pretend to be L:
x
 
(11) 𝑉𝐻(𝑇𝐻) ≥ ⁡𝑉𝐻(𝑇𝐿) − 𝑝. 
 
Given his income x and a signal s, the recipient R chooses p, TH and TL to maximize 
(12) 𝜋𝑠
𝐷𝑢𝑅(𝑥 + 𝑇𝐻) + (1 − 𝜋𝑠
𝐷)𝑢𝑅(𝑥 + 𝑇𝐿) 
subject to (10) and (11). 
 
The following two types of offer (or contracts) are possible: 
Pooling: R asks D to transfer at least t
p
 in which case no pressure is applied 𝑝=0, otherwise the 
maximal pressure  𝑝 = 𝑃  would be applied. Hence, D makes the same transfer irrespective of 
her income TL = TH = t
p
. Beliefs are therefore not updated and R never learns D’s real income. 
The transfer t
p
 is such that a type L donor is indifferent between giving tp and receiving the  
maximum amount of pressure, that is uD(L − t
p
) = uD(L) − P ; 
or 
Separating: R demands from D either a transfer of TH in exchange for no pressure, or a lower 
transfer TL(< TH ) but with some pressure 𝑝 > 0. Any other transfer would result in maximal 
pressure. D chooses to transfer more when her income is high TH > TL but she is subject to 
pressure 𝑝 > 0 when her income (and transfer) is lower. Since D’s transfer varies with her 
income, R updates his beliefs and has full information ex-post. The exact values TH , TL and 𝑝 
depend on the probabilities πs
D
 and on x.  
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The higher R’s belief that D has a high income, the more likely he is to offer a separating 
contract. This intuition is formalized in Proposition 1 whose proof is in Appendix 2. 
 
Proposition 1 There is a cutoff value of the signal ?̃? ∈ (0,1) such that R offers a pooling 
contract if  𝑠𝐷 ≤ ?̃? and R offers a separating contract if 𝑠𝐷 > ?̃? with TH (TL) increasing 
(decreasing) in s. 
 
Proposition 1 tells us that either: 
(i) 𝑠𝐷 > ?̃? and R offers a separating contract, in which case D gives a low transfer if her actual 
income is low but is subject to pressure while she gives a high transfer and receive no pressure if 
her actual income is high. R’s beliefs are correct ex-post; or 
(ii) 𝑠𝐷 ≤ ?̃?⁡ and R offers a pooling contract with transfer t
p
 > TL, in which case R overestimates 
(underestimates) D’s income ex-post if D was low (high). 
Table 5 illustrates these findings. First, there is a positive correlation between D’s actual 
income and her transfer to R. Second, for a given income level of D (H or L) there exists a 
positive correlation between the perception of D’s income by R (πD) and the transfer from D to R: 
the more R thinks D has, the higher the transfer from D to R is. 
In terms of the recipient’s income, whether a higher x affects the contract offered and, if 
so, whether it encourages separating or pooling depends on the utility function. In any case the 
correlation between the recipient’s income and the transfers is small and unlikely to be 
significant.
xi
 Finally, controlling for the recipient’s income, and therefore the actual offer, 
variation in the donor’s ex-post beliefs about the recipient stems from receiving different signals 
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under a pooling offer. This has no bearing on transfers so that, controlling for incomes, there is 
no correlation between transfers and the donor’s misperceptions. 
 
D. Exchange 
To study the exchange motive, assume that there is no pressure (P = 0) nor altruism (αD = 
0), but that the recipient can provide a service of utility value v to the donor at a utility cost c, c < 
v. The price of that service, the transfer, clearly depends on their relative bargaining power. 
 
Denote as 𝑡(𝑥), the lowest transfer that the recipient would accept to provide the service, given 
his income x: 
(13) 𝑢𝑅 (𝑥 +⁡𝑡(𝑥)) −⁡𝑢𝑅(𝑥) = 𝑐, 
and as 𝑡(𝑦), the highest transfer that a donor with income y would pay for the service: 
(14) 𝑢𝐷(𝑦) − 𝑢𝐷(𝑦 −⁡𝑡(𝑦)) = 𝑣. 
 
We assume that the relative value of the service (v/c) is sufficient that the exchange is socially 
optimal:  𝑡(𝐿) > ⁡ 𝑡(ℎ). We follow Cox and Fafchamps (2008) and Rapoport and Docquier 
(2006) and consider in turn the two extremes: the case where the donor has all the bargaining 
power and the case where the recipient has all the bargaining power. 
 
Exchange-D: Donor has the bargaining power: Assume that D gets to make a take-it-
or-leave-it offer to R. This recipient’s reservation price 𝑡(𝑥) is clearly increasing in his income x. 
Hence, D essentially chooses between a) offering 𝑡(ℎ) for the service, an offer that R always 
accepts, or b) offering a lower transfer 𝑡(ℓ) that R accepts only when his income is low. Other 
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offers are dominated. The optimal choice depends on D’s income y and her beliefs regarding R’s 
income πs
R
. D chooses a) if 
𝑢𝐷 (𝑦 − 𝑡(ℎ)) + 𝑣⁡ ≥ ⁡𝜋𝑠
𝑅𝑢𝐷(𝑦) + (1 − 𝜋𝑠
𝑅) (𝑢𝐷 (𝑦 − 𝑡(ℓ)) + 𝑣) ⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⇔ 
(15) 𝑣 ≥ [𝑢𝐷(𝑦) − 𝑢𝐷 (𝑦 − 𝑡(ℎ))] +
1−𝜋𝑠
𝑅
𝜋𝑠
𝑅 ⁡[𝑢𝐷 (𝑦 − 𝑡(ℓ)) − 𝑢𝐷 (𝑦 − 𝑡(ℎ))] 
and chooses b) otherwise. Higher πs
R
 makes this inequality more likely to hold. For low values of 
the signal sR, πs
R
 is close to 0 and Inequality (15) cannot hold, while for high values of the signal 
sR, πs
R
 is close to 1 and (15) is necessarily satisfied. 
 
Proposition 2 There is a cutoff value of the signal 𝑠 ∈ (0,1) such that D offers 𝑡(ℓ) if 𝑠𝑅 ≤ 𝑠 and 
D offers 𝑡(ℎ) if 𝑠𝑅 > 𝑠. 
D offers 𝑡(ℓ) when she receives a signal that the recipient’s income is likely to be low 
(𝑠𝑅 ≤ 𝑠), and she offers 𝑡(h) when the signal indicates that recipient’s income is likely to be high 
(𝑠𝑅 > 𝑠). Table 6 illustrates these findings. 
Controlling for D’s perception of R’s income, the actual transfer is negatively correlated 
with R’s actual income. And controlling for the actual realization of R’s income (x), the 
correlation between the transfer and D’s perception of R’s income (πR) is ambiguous: it is 
positive for low values of x and negative for high values of x. 
What about the donor’s income y? A higher income makes inequality (15) more likely to 
hold. Richer donors are more likely to offer the high price  𝑡(ℎ) so that the threshold 𝑠 is smaller 
for richer donors. This implies a positive correlation between transfers and donor’s income. This 
correlation is likely to be small as it comes only from the realization of the signal that reveals y’s 
income: the realizations of the signal sR that lies between the threshold 𝑠 for y = H and the 
threshold 𝑠 for y = L. Controlling for the actual income of the donor, only the signal that the 
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recipient receives affects his beliefs about the donor’s income so that there is no correlation with 
the transfers.  
 
Exchange-R: Recipient has the bargaining power: Now, assume that the recipient 
gets to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the donor. It is easy to check that the donor’s 
reservation price 𝑡(𝑦) too is increasing in her income. Hence, R essentially chooses between two 
options: a) demanding 𝑡(𝐿) for the service, an offer that D always accepts, or b) demanding a 
higher transfer 𝑡(𝐻) that D rejects when her income is low but accepts when her income is high. 
Other demands would be dominated by one of these two options. R’s chosen option depends on 
his income x and his beliefs about D’s income πs
D
. R chooses a) if 
𝑢𝑅 (𝑥 − 𝑡(𝐿)) − 𝑐⁡ ≥ ⁡𝜋𝑠
𝐷 [𝑢𝑅 (𝑥 − 𝑡(𝐻)) − 𝑐] + (1 − 𝜋𝑠
𝐷)𝑢𝑅(𝑥) ⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⇔ 
(16) [𝑢𝑅 (𝑥 + 𝑡(𝐿)) − 𝑢𝑅(𝑥)] − 𝑐 ≥
𝜋𝑠
𝐷
1−𝜋𝑠
𝐷 ⁡ [𝑢𝑅 (𝑥 − 𝑡(𝐻)) − 𝑢𝑅(𝑥 − 𝑡(𝐿))] 
and chooses b) otherwise. We see that when πs
D
 is close to 0, inequality (16) is satisfied while it 
fails for value of πs
D
 close to 1. The higher πs
D
 is the more likely R is to ask  𝑡(𝐻). 
 
Proposition 3 There is a cutoff value of the signal s∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that R asks 𝑡(𝐿) if sD ≤ s∗ and 
R asks 𝑡(𝐻) if sD > s∗. 
R asks 𝑡(𝐿) when he receives a signal that the donor’s income is likely to be low, and he 
offers 𝑡(𝐻) when the signal indicates that donor’s income is likely to be high. Controlling for D’s 
income (y), the transfer is positively correlated with R’s perception of D’s income (πs
D
) and, 
controlling for R’s perception of D’s income, the transfer is positively correlated with D’s 
income. Table 7 illustrates these findings. 
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Again, there will be a correlation between the recipient’s income x and the transfers only 
for the signal values for which if it affects the scenario that R chooses. Hence, this effect should 
be small. As a higher income for the recipient could make him more or less likely to select 
a) depending on the values of 𝑡(𝐿) and 𝑡(𝐻) and on his utility function, this correlation, if there 
is one, could go in any direction. Controlling for R’s actual income x, only the signal about it 
causes variation in D’s beliefs about R’s income and this is uncorrelated with the transfers. 
 
E. Risk Sharing 
So far, we have considered only static models of transfers. That focus is, to some extent, 
due to the KHDS data on which our empirics are built. We do not have repeated data on 
consumption per capita for our households and we measure misperceptions through cross-reports 
on assets. It is nevertheless worth briefly discussing risk sharing. 
Imagine that our two individuals draw an income realization in each period. For 
simplicity, assume away the signal. Instead individuals send messages to each other regarding the 
realization of their income. The prescribed transfers depend on these reports as well as the 
history of previous reports. Under the constrained optimal risk sharing scheme (see Cole and 
Kocherlakota 1999, Attanasio and Pavoni 2011, Cole and Kocherlakota 1999, Kinnan 2009 and 
Hauser and Hopenhayn 2008 among others), the prescribed transfers and continuation utilities 
must be such that individuals truthfully reveal their income and there are no misperceptions left. 
Although the prescribed transfer from a donor to a recipient is history dependent,
xii 
transfers are 
increasing in the income realization of the donor and decreasing in the income realization of the 
recipient. Assuming that the effect of the difference in average income between these individuals 
(see Genicot 2006) is small – this effect is absent for instance in the case of log utility – the 
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prediction that transfers are increasing in the income realization of the donor and decreasing in 
the income realization of the recipient would hold even without controlling for the average 
income of the individual. 
 
F. Predictions 
Table 8 summarizes the predicted partial correlations between transfers, donor’s and 
recipient’s income, and misperception under the four motives. That is, it shows the predicted 
correlations between the transfers and the donor’s (recipient’s) misperception controlling for the 
income realizations and the other’s misperception, and the predicted partial correlation between 
the transfers and the donor’s (recipient’s) income controlling for the misperceptions and the 
other’s income. These correspond to the predictions regarding the regression coefficients in the 
next section. Importantly, the misperceptions concern ex-post beliefs, so that these correlations 
take into account the feedback mechanisms through which transfers influence beliefs. 
We made two decisions for the table. First, some misperceptions in the data are 
likely due to measurement errors/noise. Hence, when the model predicts no 
misperception at all and therefore no correlation could be calculated, we enter 0. If the 
misperceptions are just due to noise then one would expect a zero correlation. Second, 
recall that in the pressure and exchange-R models, the partial correlation between the 
transfers and R’s income are likely to be small as it exists only when the type of contract 
chosen by R changes with his income, and in addition the overall effect averages some 
positive and negative effects.xiii Hence, we enter ϵ in Table 8 for these effects. 
 Finally, note that if the opportunity presents itself, households might hide some of 
their income. Access to a hiding technology would result in an increase in the precision 
of a high signal and reduce the prediction of a low signal. Hence, the existence of a 
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(partial) hiding technology would not affect our main predictions, though it would 
attenuate some of the effects. Similarly, access to a costly monitoring would not affect the 
predicted correlations.
xiv
 
 
V. ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND TRANSFERS 
This section tests the predictions from Table 8 regarding the partial correlations between 
transfers (TRD) received by any household R in the family network from any other family D in the 
same network and (i) the degree of misperceptions of the recipient about the donor (ΩRD or Ω'RD), 
(ii) the degree of misperceptions of the donor about the recipient (ΩDR or Ω'DR), (iii) the donor’s 
living standards (ID) and (iv) the recipient’s living standards (IR). Living standards are proxied by 
log consumption per capita. 
We estimate these partial correlations through dyadic regressions of TRD, whether or not 
D reported giving transfers to R in the year preceding the survey,
xv 
on the four correlates that we 
are interested in. This brings with it a number of econometric challenges. The first is that we 
need to condition the correlations on the correct variables in order to get unbiased estimates. In 
the model, we assume everything constant across both donor and recipient. We can implement 
this empirically by using a two-way fixed effect model, which includes a fixed effect for R and D, 
αR and αD, respectively.
xvi
 While this does not capture any dyadic specific heterogeneity that may 
cloud these correlations, we also control for a set of observable dyadic characteristics describing 
the relationship between donor and recipient households to minimize such concerns. 
 
Our preferred regression then is: 
(17) 𝑇𝑅𝐷 = β1Ω𝑅𝐷 + β2Ω𝐷𝑅 + 𝐏𝑅𝐷𝛾1 + α𝑅 + α𝐷 + ϵ𝑅𝐷 
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where ϵRD is an error term and PRD is a vector of variables describing the relationship between the 
R-D household pair. This includes whether the heads of both households share the same religion 
or tribe, whether a child or parent relationship links both households, the geographic distance 
between the two households and the number of DK responses to the asymmetric information 
questions each side of the dyad gave. 
A second econometric issue arises from the fact that Ω and Ω' are predicted values, which 
means that standard parametric approaches will overstate the precision with which they are 
measured. We therefore present bootstrapped standard errors, calculated through the two-step 
procedure described in the online Appendix 1. 
One of the variables of interest from the model predictions in Table 8 is D’s standard of 
living ID, which is subsumed in the fixed effect αD. To retrieve an estimate of the coefficient of 
ID, we drop αD in Equation (17) and replace it with the natural logarithm of D’s consumption and 
other characteristics of D. We estimate: 
(18) 𝑇𝑅𝐷 = β1Ω𝑅𝐷 + β2Ω𝐷𝑅 + β3𝐼𝐷 + 𝐏𝑅𝐷𝛾1 + 𝐙𝐷𝛾2 + α𝑅 + ϵ𝑅𝐷 
where ZD is a vector of household D characteristics including the sex, age and years of education 
of the household head, whether the household owns a phone or a motorized vehicle (as these may 
serve to lower the cost of transfers), as well as the number of household members that fall in each 
of eight exclusive and exhaustive age-sex categories (this controls for household size). 
Similarly, to retrieve an estimate on the IR variable we drop αR in Equation (17) and replace it 
with R’s consumption and other characteristics: 
(19) 𝑇𝑅𝐷 = β1Ω𝑅𝐷 + β2Ω𝐷𝑅 + β4𝐼𝑅 + 𝐏𝑅𝐷𝛾1 + 𝐙𝑅𝛾2 + α𝐷 + ϵ𝑅𝐷. 
 
We can determine TRD in two ways. First, we can use what R reports receiving from D in the 
incoming gifts section of his questionnaire. Alternatively, we can use what D reports giving to R 
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in the outgoing gifts section of her questionnaire. When we run the two-way fixed effects 
regressions, we report the results both ways. When we omit one of the fixed effects, we use the 
report from the questionnaire of whoever’s fixed effect is still included, that is when we drop the 
donor fixed effect, we use the recipient’s report of transfers in. The advantage of this approach is 
that the controls Z are measured independently from the transfer measure used on the left hand 
side of the equation since they are sourced from a different questionnaire. Each regression table 
will show in the heading not only which equation is being estimated, but also whether the 
transfers used on the left hand side are from the questionnaire of R or D. 
It is worth recalling that we do not attach a causal interpretation to these coefficients. In fact, 
the model explicitly allows for feedback mechanisms between the level of transfers and 
perceptions. For example, in a separating equilibrium, a high TRD will cause beliefs ΩRD to be 
revised upwards. We use the dyadic regression set-up as a convenient way to retrieve the partial 
correlations, measured by β1, β2, β3 and β4, in order to compare their signs to the predictions from 
Table 8. 
We estimate Equations (18) and (19) separately for both Ω and Ω' Equation (17) is only 
reported for Ω, since, as can be seen from Equations (3) and (4) above, the difference between Ω 
and Ω' is subsumed in the double fixed effect and, in consequence, the regression results for both 
measures are identical. All equations are estimated using linear probability models. 
The picture that emerges from this table is clearly that β1 > 0, β2 = 0, β3 > 0 and β4 = 0, 
which is consistent with either pressure or exchange-R in Table 8.
xvii
 From the first and second 
columns we see that when ΩRD goes up with one standard deviation (=0.315), then, depending on 
the specification, the likelihood of a transfer goes up by two to three percentage points, which 
represents 11% to 14% of the prevalence of transfers among dyads. The absence of a negative 
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coefficient on the the recipient’s income, β4, allows us to reject both altruism and exchange-D as 
motives of transfers. We can also reject the hypothesis that β2, the coefficient on ΩDR, is smaller 
than zero, thus rejecting a second prediction of the altruism model. 
The absence of negative correlation between transfers and the recipient’s income is 
consistent with the finding of Lucas and Stark (1985) and Cox, Eser, and Jimenez (1998) who 
reject altruism as a motive for remittances among migrants in Botswana and as a motive for 
transfers in Peru. In contrast, Kazianga (2006) finds some support for the altruistic motive among 
the middle income class in Burkina Faso, but not for low income levels, and in the US, Altonji, 
Hayashi, and Kotlikoff (1997) finds a negative correlation between in-vivo transfers and the 
recipient’s income in support of the altruism remittance motive. 
We can check that our findings are unaltered if we use different measures of the perceptions 
of standard of living, coming from the ladder questions described in Section III.D. We run 
slightly different versions of Equations (17), (18) and (19), where we include a measure for 
whether i places j on the lowest steps 1, 2 or 3 of the ladder, 𝐿𝑖𝑗, or the highest steps 7, 8, 9 of the 
ladder, 𝐿𝑖𝑗. Furthermore, the variables measuring the number of don’t know responses to 
asymmetric information questions are replaced by two dummy variables indicating that don’t 
know responses were given to the ladder questions by the donor or the recipient, respectively. 
The two way fixed-effects version then becomes:  
(20) 𝑇𝑅𝐷 =⁡𝛿1𝐿𝑅𝐷 + 𝛿2𝐿𝑅𝐷 + 𝛿3𝐿𝐷𝑅 + 𝛿4𝐿𝐷𝑅 + 𝐏𝑅𝐷𝛾1 + α𝑅 + α𝐷 + ϵ𝑅𝐷. 
 
Unlike the Ω variables, these ladder questions are not predicted values, but are directly 
reported in the questionnaire. We do not bootstrap the standard errors here, but still need to allow 
for correlations between transfers received by the same recipient or sent by the same donor to 
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avoid biased estimates of the standard errors. We use the non-nested two-way clustering 
approach developed by Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2011) and implemented in Stata by 
Baum, Shaffer, and Stillman (2007)xviii with clustering on both R and D. 
The FE specification allow us to capture any fixed unobserved characteristic of the recipient 
or of the donor, which may systematically affect their relative perceptions of the positions of 
other households in their family network. As above, to retrieve estimates of the coefficients on ID 
and IR, we estimate 
(21) 𝑇𝑅𝐷 =⁡𝛿1𝐿𝑅𝐷 + 𝛿2𝐿𝑅𝐷 + 𝛿3𝐿𝐷𝑅 + 𝛿4𝐿𝐷𝑅 + 𝐏𝑅𝐷𝛾1 + β3𝐼𝐷 + 𝐙𝐷𝛾2 + α𝑅 +
ϵ𝑅𝐷 
and 
(22) 𝑇𝑅𝐷 =⁡𝛿1𝐿𝑅𝐷 + 𝛿2𝐿𝑅𝐷 + 𝛿3𝐿𝐷𝑅 + 𝛿4𝐿𝐷𝑅 + 𝐏𝑅𝐷𝛾1 + β4𝐼𝑅 + 𝐙𝑅𝛾2 + α𝐷 +
ϵ𝑅𝐷. 
 
Table 10 shows the estimates of these three equations. As above we use the transfer report 
from the questionnaire of whoever’s fixed effect is still included. We show results both ways for 
the double fixed effect. To be consistent with the results above, we would expect to see that, 
controlling for D’s actual consumption (through either αD or ID), lower perceptions of R about 
D’s standard of living are correlated with a lower likelihood of transfers from D to R, which 
implies δ1 < 0 and, symmetrically, that higher perceptions of R about D’s standard of living are 
correlated with a higher likelihood of transfers from D to R, that is δ2 > 0. As before, we expect 
δ3 = 0, δ4 = 0, β3 > 0 and β4 = 0. Table 10 does yield this pattern, except for the estimated 
coefficients δ2 which turn out to be largely not significantly different from zero at conventional 
levels. This anomaly could be attributed to the fact that this category holds only 5% of the 
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observations. However expanding the boundaries does not make a difference. Taken together, 
these results support the main results indicating that the power in the gift-giving relationship lies 
with the recipient of the transfer, consistent with either a pressure model or an exchange model in 
which the recipient holds the bargaining power.
xix
 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This article analyzed how private transfers between linked households relate to actual and 
perceived living standards. To do this, we built novel measures of asymmetric information that 
compare actual to perceived asset holdings. We applied these measures to original survey data on 
households belonging to 712 extended family networks in Tanzania. Using rich information on 
their relationships and characteristics, we validated our measures of misperceptions of living 
standards and showed that the degree of misperception increases with genetic, social and 
physical distance between households. We found, on the one hand, substantial asymmetry of 
information within our extended family network, but on the other hand that perceptions are 
correct on average. 
We then developed simple static models to predict the correlations between income, 
misperceptions of income and transfers depending on whether it is altruism, exchange or pressure 
that is the main driver of transfers. We showed that the predictions of these models differ. In 
particular, when the recipient plays an active role (either in a model of pressure to give or in a 
model of exchange in which the recipient holds all the bargaining power), transfers have a 
positive partial correlation to the donor’s actual income and to the recipient’s misperception of 
that income (a positive value of misperceptions indicating over-estimation of income). In 
contrast, when transfers are motivated by pure altruism of the donor, their partial correlation to 
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the income of the recipient and to the misperception of it by the donor are negative. Finally, the 
recipient’s income is negatively correlated to transfers under an exchange model in which the 
donor holds the bargaining power. 
Our data support a model of pressure to give or a model of exchange in which the 
recipient holds substantial bargaining power. These results highlight the active role played by 
recipients of transfers in our setting and show that it is possible to disentangle some motives of 
transfers using cross-sectional household survey data on linked households. 
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Table 1 
Asymmetric information 
 
 Underestimate Spot-on Overestimate DK 
Completed O’level 0.029 0.920 0.022 0.029 
Has formal job 0.054 0.872 0.008 0.066 
Owns house 0.088 0.748 0.095 0.068 
Owns land 0.120 0.761 0.048 0.071 
Owns livestock 0.059 0.745 0.072 0.123 
Owns phone 0.096 0.725 0.075 0.105 
Owns TV 0.080 0.720 0.044 0.156 
Owns motorized vehic 0.040 0.667 0.142 0.151 
Notes: Comparing actual realizations to beliefs held by extended family members. Cells indicate 
the proportion of observations. Completed O’level means having completed the first four (out of 
six) years of secondary education. N=9,032. 
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Table 2 
Weights in Ω 
 
                                         Coefficient 
Completed O’level 0.161** 
 (2.190) 
Has formal job 0.185*** 
 (5.620) 
Owns house -0.264*** 
 (-4.223) 
Owns phone 0.300*** 
 (15.492) 
Owns TV 0.240** 
 (2.060) 
Owns vehicle 0.272*** 
 (3.833) 
Owns phone * Completed O’level 0.079 
 (0.996) 
Owns TV * Owns phone 0.085 
 (0.716) 
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Owns vehicle * Owns house 0.207*** 
 (2.716) 
Age of hh head * Owns house 0.004*** 
 (2.764) 
Age of hh head * Owns land 0.001 
 (0.847) 
Urban 0.160*** 
 (7.701) 
Age of hh head -0.009*** 
 (-5.423) 
Males 0-5 years -0.216*** 
 (-17.926) 
Males 6-15 years -0.103*** 
 (-10.459) 
Females 0-5 years -0.214*** 
 (-17.632) 
Females 6-15 years -0.099*** 
 (-9.862) 
Constant 13.466*** 
 (237.160) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.565 
N 3,173 
Notes: Final weights in Ω Variables selected with LASSO. t statistics between brackets under the 
coefficient. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Table 3 
Comparing Ω to subjective perceptions 
 
 
 
Ω
ij Ω'ij 
i places j on bottom 3 rungs of 9-step ladder -0.071*** -0.108*** 
 (-7.016) (-8.903) 
i places j on top 3 rungs of 9-step ladder 0.101*** 0.225*** 
 (4.993) (9.264) 
i gives DK answer to ladder question regarding j -0.041** -0.064*** 
 (-2.327) (-3.037) 
log of j’s actual consumption per capita -0.130*** -0.582*** 
 (-21.878) (-81.738) 
Constant 1.758*** 7.722*** 
 (22.274) (81.602) 
N 9,032 9,032 
Notes: Household i fixed effect regression of Ω and Ω' on 3 ladder dummies indicating where 
household i places household j on a 9-step ladder. Regressions control for the number of don’t 
know responses to the asymmetric information questions that each side of the dyad gave. 
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Table 4 
Correct expectations and distance 
 
 Ωij = 0 Ω'ij ≈ 0 
Distance between HHs (100 km) -0.0089*** 
-
0.0040** 
 (-7.916) (-2.413) 
j located in urban area -0.0708*** -0.0176 
 (-10.221) (-1.549) 
Parent-child link 0.0178** 0.0008 
 (2.207) (0.055) 
i and j communicated in the past 2 years 0.0214** -0.0161 
 (2.165) (-0.967) 
Number of years since i and j last lived together 0.0013** 0.0017* 
 (2.314) (1.691) 
Shared at least one meal in the past month 0.0091 0.0401** 
 (0.995) (2.326) 
N 9,032 9,032 
Percent of observations with LHS = 1 27% 39% 
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Notes: Probit regressions of correct expectations. Marginal effect reported. t statistics in brackets 
under the coefficient. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Regressions also control for the 
number of don’t know responses to the asymmetric information questions that each side of the 
dyad gave and an indicator variable for 36 missing km distance observations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 
Summary of the Pressure Model 
 
D’s income Signal Contract to D Transfers to R* ΩRD 
L 𝑠𝐷 > ?̃? separating low (TL) = 0 (correct) 
 𝑠𝐷 ≤ ?̃? pooling medium (t
P
) > 0 (overestimate) 
H 𝑠𝐷 > ?̃? separating high (TH) = 0 (correct) 
 𝑠𝐷 ≤ ?̃? pooling medium (t
P
) < 0 (underestimate) 
* TL < t
P 
 < TH      
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Table 6 
Summary of Exchange-D scenario [3] 
 
R’s income Signal Offer to R Transfers to R* ΩRD 
ℓ 𝑠𝑅 > 𝑠 𝑡(ℎ) 𝑡(ℎ) > 0 (overestimate) 
 𝑠𝑅 ≤ 𝑠 𝑡(ℓ) 𝑡(ℓ) = 0 (correct) 
h 𝑠𝑅 > 𝑠 𝑡(ℎ) 𝑡(ℎ) < 0 (underestimate) 
 𝑠𝑅 ≤ 𝑠 𝑡(ℓ)             0 = 0 (correct) 
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Table 7 
Summary of Exchange-R scenario [3] 
 
D’s income Signal Demand to D Transfers to R* ΩRD 
L 𝑠𝐷 > 𝑠
∗ 𝑡(𝐻)           0 = 0 (correct) 
 𝑠𝐷 ≤ 𝑠
∗ 𝑡(𝐿) 𝑡(𝐿) > 0 (overestimate) 
H 𝑠𝐷 > 𝑠
∗ 𝑡(𝐻) 𝑡(𝐻) = 0 (correct) 
 𝑠𝐷 ≤ 𝑠
∗ 𝑡(𝐿)          𝑡(𝐿) < 0 (underestimate) 
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Table 8 
Predictions 
 
Partial correlation between transfer and: ΩRD ΩDR D’s income R’s income 
Model     
Altruism 0 − + − 
Pressure + 0 + ϵ+ 
Exchange-D 0 A + − 
Exchange-R + 0 +     ϵ 
Risk Sharing 0 0 + − 
Notes: A=ambiguous; ϵ+ small non negative effect; ϵ small ambiguous effect. 
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Table 9 
Main Results, Partial correlations with transfers: Ω and income 
 
Equation No.      (17)       (17)       (18)       (19)       (18)       (19) 
Transfer report R D R R D D 
ΩRD 0.075*** 0.090*** 0.081***  0.056***  
 (0.029) (0.030) (0.020)  (0.020)  
ΩDR 0.036 0.011 0.033  0.026  
Ω'RD 
(0.028) (0.030) (0.021)  (0.019)  
   0.118***  0.056*** 
    (0.018)  (0.020) 
Ω'DR    0.032  0.012 
    (0.021)  (0.017) 
ID   0.040*** 0.141***   
   (0.011) (0.019)   
IR     0.007 0.017 
     (0.010) (0.018) 
R
2 
0.72 0.72 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.11 
N 9,032 9,032 9,032 9,032 9,032 9,032 
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Notes: Fixed effect linear probability models with bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses 
under the coefficient. Each column heading indicates, in brackets, the equation being estimated 
and below that, italicized, whether the left-hand side transfer variable is reported by R or D. * p < 
0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. N=9032. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10 
Partial correlations with transfers: ladder and income 
 
Equation No.       (20)       (20)         (21)        (22)  
Transfer report R D R D  
R places D low on ladder (LRD) -0.052*** -0.025* -0.082*** -0.015*  
 (0.016) (0.015) (0.011) (0.009)  
R places D high on ladder (L
RD
) -0.006 -0.033 0.043* -0.019  
 (0.034) (0.032) (0.025) (0.020)  
D places R low on ladder (LDR) -0.015 0.000 -0.005 0.005  
 (0.016) (0.015) (0.010) (0.011)  
D places R high on ladder (L
DR
) -0.003 -0.040 -0.013 -0.029  
 (0.030) (0.035) (0.019) (0.022)  
ID   0.034***   
   (0.009)   
IR    0.005  
    (0.009)  
R
2
 0.64 0.64 0.09 0.10  
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Notes: Fixed Effect Linear probability models. Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses 
under the coefficient, with clustering on both R and D. Each column heading indicates, in 
brackets, the equation being estimated and below that, italicized, whether the left-hand side 
transfer variable is reported by R or D. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. N= 13,808. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX : SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 
Table A1  
Summary Statistics of Household Variables 
 
                                  Mean SD 
Log consumption per capita 13.12 0.70 
Urban 0.34 0.47 
Completed O’level 0.13 0.33 
Has formal job 0.09 0.28 
Owns house 0.75 0.43 
Owns land 0.87 0.34 
Owns livestock 0.12 0.33 
Owns phone 0.60 0.49 
Owns TV 0.19 0.39 
Owns vehicle 0.09 0.29 
Head is male 0.80 0.40 
Age of hh head 41.04 15.14 
Males 0-5 years 0.50 0.71 
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Males 6-15 years 0.60 0.87 
Males 16-60 years 1.07 0.73 
Males 61+ years 0.08 0.27 
Females 0-5 years 0.49 0.70 
Females 6-15 years 0.61 0.86 
Females 16-60 years 1.11 0.74 
Females 61+ years 0.11 0.33 
Notes: N = 3,173. 
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Table A2 
Summary Statistics of Dyadic Variables 
 
 Sample Sample 
 N = 9,032 N = 13,808 
 Mean SD Mean SD 
D reports giving gift to R in past 12 months 0.20 0.40 0.24 0.42 
ΩRD 0.01 0.32 0.01 0.31 
ΩDR 0.01 0.32 0.01 0.31 
Ω'RD 0.00 0.53 -0.00 0.53 
Ω'DR 0.00 0.53 -0.00 0.53 
  R places D low on ladder (LRD) 0.41 0.49 0.42 0.49 
R places D high on ladder (LRD) 0.05 0.21 0.04 0.21 
R answers DK on ladder question about D 0.11 0.31 0.09 0.28 
  D places R low on ladder (LDR) 0.41 0.49 0.42 0.49 
D places R high on ladder (LDR) 0.05 0.21 0.04 0.21 
D answers DK on ladder question about R 0.11 0.31 0.09 0.28 
IR 13.19 0.72 13.13 0.69 
R HH head is male 0.82 0.39 0.81 0.39 
R HH head age 39.93 14.22 40.51 14.77 
R HH head years education 6.74 3.27 6.40 3.23 
R HH No. Males 0-5 years 0.49 0.69 0.51 0.71 
R HH No. Males 6-15 years 0.60 0.87 0.62 0.89 
R HH No. Males 16-60 years 1.08 0.74 1.07 0.71 
R HH No. Males 61+ years 0.06 0.25 0.07 0.26 
R HH No. Females 0-5 years 0.49 0.69 0.50 0.70 
R HH No. Females 6-15 years 0.60 0.86 0.62 0.87 
R HH No. Females 16-60 years 1.12 0.74 1.12 0.75 
R HH No. Females 61+ years 0.10 0.31 0.11 0.32 
i has phone 0.66 0.47 0.61 0.49 
i has vehicle 0.12 0.32 0.11 0.31 
Parent-child link 0.17 0.38 0.22 0.41 
km distance 214.07 339.40 150.51 295.71 
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i
 In addition, we consider the implications of a dynamic risk sharing model with asymmetry of 
information. However, since our measures of misperception are based on assets, it is better suited 
to capture asymmetry of information regarding medium term standard of living, rather than 
asymmetry of information regarding short term income shocks.
 
 
ii
 The field work was implemented in 2010 by Economic Development Initiatives (EDI). A full 
description of the fieldwork and data can be found in De Weerdt et al. (2012). 
iii
 De Weerdt and Hirvonen (2015) study how consumption co-moves across linked nodes in these 
networks. 
iv
  The questionnaire included extensive food and non-food consumption modules. The final 
consumption aggregate includes purchased and home-produced food, as well as food eaten 
outside of the household. It contains 51 food items and 27 non-food items.  The aggregates are 
temporally and spatially deflated using data from a price questionnaire included in the survey.  
Consumption is expressed in annual per capita terms using 2010 Tanzanian shillings. A full 
description of the consumption aggregate is available at 
http : //www.edi-africa.com/research/khds/introduction.htm. 
 
v
 Out of all dyads in our larger sample 53% communicated at least once in the month preceding 
the survey, while for 5% the last communication was over 5 years ago (within the smaller sample 
41% of dyads communicated within the past month and 7% within the past year). By contrast, 
the reports from interviewed households about untraced households (which constitute dyads that 
are dropped from the analysis) show that only 26% of such pairs communicated within the last 
month and 23% over 5 years ago. Our main empirical results also hold for dyads that did not 
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communicate recently, giving some credence that attrition - in as far as it relates to the strength 
of communication between network members - is not a major concern. 
vi
  Perceptions of educational attainment and occupation were collected for each original panel 
member (that is individuals who were member of the baseline household) currently member of j. 
The perceptions on the 6 assets were asked at the j-household level. 
vii
 We implemented the procedure using the LassoShooting ado file made available by Christian 
Hansen on his homepage here http : //f aculty.chicagobooth.edu/christian.hansen/research/. 
viii
 See also Stark(1995). 
ix
  The same predictions would apply if the recipient was also altruistic towards the donor. This is 
also the finding of Barczyk and Kredler (2014) in a dynamic and continuous time context. In 
addition, if they care about each other’s total utility (and not just each other’s utility of 
consumption) then an interesting signaling game among donors arise as shown in Genicot 
(2016). However, if the degree of altruism of the donor was not known to the recipient, then 
there could be a positive correlation between the transfers and the recipient’s misperception of 
the donor’s income controlling for the donor’s income. 
x
   As usual, (10) and (11) imply that 𝑉𝐻(𝑇𝐻) − 𝑝 ≥ ⁡𝑉𝐻(0) − 𝑃. This is shown in the online 
Appendix 2. 
 
xi
  If the recipient utility function exhibits diminishing risk aversion then the recipient may be 
more likely to offer a separating contract when his income is high (?̃? decreases) and, for any 
given signal sD above the threshold, R may ask a higher TH and a lower TL when his income is 
high. Since a higher spread between TL and TH must come with a slightly higher mean transfer, 
this could imply a small positive correlation between the transfers and the recipient’s income. 
xii
  Incentive compatibility requires the transfer to decrease with recent claims from the recipient. 
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xiii
 Under decreasing risk aversion, though small the overall effect would be positive under the 
pressure model but ambiguous in the exchange-R model. 
xiv
 See de Laat (2014) for evidence of split household members engaging in costly monitoring. 
xv
  25% of dyads have TRD=1 
xvi
 These models have been discussed by Mittag (2012), with De Weerdt (2004) providing an 
early application of two-way fixed effects in dyadic regressions for network analysis. 
xvii
 To identify dyads with potentially larger means of pressure or bargaining power in the hands 
of the recipient, we also interacted the income of the Donor and the perceptions of the donor 
income with an indicator of whether the donor household hosts a child of Recipient household. 
The interaction with Donor’s income is significant and positive, suggesting extra power of the 
recipient household in this type of parent-child relationship.  
xviii
 An alternative method is provided by Fafchamps and Gubert (2007) 
xix
  The online Appendix 3 shows that these results remain robust under a number of alternative 
specifications such as using the intensive margin of transfers (value), using proxies for pre-
transfer incomes, including dyads living in the same location (large sample) and using discrete 
choice modelling to relax the assumptions underlying the linear probability model. 
